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[With Danny get exact documented visits + phonecalls:]

Edwin J Lopez prepared by Dan Hardway

SCENARIO

CHRONOLOGY OF OSWALD'S VISITS TO THE SOVIET AND CUBAN EMBASSIES.

September 26, 1963 Thursday

(1) A man claiming to be Oswald vists the Cuban Embassy between 10:00 A.M. and 2:00 P.M. The visit probably occurs around one o'clock. "Oswald" is discribed as 5'6" tall, blond hair, sunken cheeks, very thin, aquiline nose, very straight eyebrows, approximately 35 years old and wearing a light blue Prince of Wales suit. He was said to look very cold with a hard face and a penetrating cunning way of looking at you. "Oswald" was seeking an intransit visa to Cuba on his way to Russia. He displayed documents that showed his membership in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and the American Communist Party. He was told that he would have to first obtain a visa to Russia before he could be issued an intransit visa. He is also told that he should return to the Cuban Embassy with his passport and a copy of a photograph in order to fill out the visa application.

Azcue

September 27, 1963 Friday

Circa 10:30 A.M. — Teltap — a

"Oswald" calls the Soviet Military Attache (SMA) with whom he speaks in Spanish. He tells the SMA that he is looking for a visa to Odessa. The SMA tells him to call the Consulate. "Oswald" asks for directions to the Embassy and recieves them.

10:37 A.M. — Teltap — b

"Oswald" calls the Soviet Consulate and asks to speak to the Consul in Spanish. He is told that the Consul is not in. He is told that he can call back at 11:30. "Oswald" says that he is looking for a visa to Odessa.

circa 11:30 A.M. — Tel tap at 4:26 — (2)

"Oswald" goes to the Russian Embassy where he once again exhibits the documents he has already shown the Cubans as well as other documents such as his and Marina's marriage license. "Oswald" discusses his situation with someone at the Embassy and comes away with the understanding that everything would be expeditiously handled.

circa 12:15 P.M. — Stop here Azcue —

Someone from the Soviet Embassy calls Azcue whom he is aware of because of what "Oswald" has told him, and tells him that they have to get authorization from Moscow to grant him a visa and that it will probably take four months.

circa 12:45 A.M.

(3) "Oswald" returns to the Cuban Embassy with the

9/27/63
12:45 (cont'd)

Azque

Silvia say
5:00

Duran

photo and completes the visa application, stating that he would like to leave in three days. He asks Azcue about how long it will take to get the visa. Azcue explains his misconception to him, an argument results and Azcue throws Oswald out. Duran feels sympathetic to Oswald, gives him ~~her address~~ and promises to help in any ~~way she can.~~ She feels that Oswald should have been granted the visa with no problems and that Azcue's actions are wrong. w/C

1:25 P.M.

Oswald calls the Soviet Consulate in an attempt to find out what has gone wrong with the arraingment he thought he had. In Spanish, he asks for the Consul. He is told that the Consul is out and that he can be contacted between four and five on Mondays and Fridays. This call may have been from Duran's phone. If it was he then told her that he could get hold of the Soviet he had his deal with and would she be kind enough to talk to him. She said that she would and to come back at four o'clock. If the call was not made then Oswald got this message to Silvia and the same arraingments for Silvia's four o'clock call were made.

4:05 P.M.

Tel tap

Silvia Duran calls the Soviet Embassy. She tells them the American citizen, the one who wants a visa to Cuba in transit to Russia, is there. She asks who he talked to at the Soviet Embassy when she sent him there to get a Soviet visa so he could get an intransit visa to Cuba. She tells the official she is speaking with that the man seeking the visa wants to know with whom he spoke because he had been assured that there would be no problem. The man at the Soviet Embassy puts another man on the phone and Silvia goes through it again. He tells her that her call will be returned.

4:26 P.M.

Tel Tap

A Soviet Official returns Silvia's call. The situation is explained to Silvia. She realizes that she cannot give him a visa because of the delay on the Soviet end and the fact that he does not know anyone in Cuba. What does Silvia tell Oswald who is still setting there waiting? In light of subsequent events it was probably something that would keep his hopes up.

Night

?

Oswald goes to a party at Rubin Duran's with Silvia and two American friends. This may have been, more likely was, the night of the 26th. He is seen by Elena Garro de Paz. He spends the night with Silvia.

September 28, 1963 Saturday	
circa 11:00 A.M.	(5) Oswald is back at the Soviet Embassy bugging them to expedite his visa. They send him back to the Cuban Embassy to get an address.
11:51	6) d Duran calls the Soviet Consulate and puts Oswald on the phone. He tells them that he is returning to the Soviet Embassy with the address.
circa 12:00	7) Oswald returns to the Soviet Embassy and is assured that a telegram will be sent and that it will be handled as quickly as possible.
afternoon	Oswald decides that he needs more help and tracks down a revolutionary, pro-Castro Cuban group on the campus of the University of Mexico. Maybe he hopes that he can find someone who will say they know him in Cuba. In any case, he seeks some sort of assistance from these Pro-Castroites. He spends the night with them.
September 29, 1963 Sunday Morning	Oswald spends the day with the Pro-Castro group.
Sunday Afternoon/ evening and night	?
September 30, 1963 Monday	? Note: the association with the Cuban group could have been anytime between the afternoon of 9/28 and the afternoon of 9/30. Contreras said that he met Oswald in the afternoon and spent the rest of the day, that night and part of the next day with him.
October 1, 1963 10:31 A.M. Tuesday	e Oswald calls the Soviet Military Attache inquiring about a telegram. He is refered to the Consulate.
10:45 A.M.	f Oswald calls the consulate with the same inquiry and learns that the telegram has been sent but no reply has been received. He is discouraged. Obyedkov hangs up on him.
later or earlier	g Oswald calls the man with whom he had made his "arrangement" and discusses the assistance that was promised him. He is dangled and the man eventually hangs up on him.
later or on the 2nd. Wednesday	Oswald leaves Mexico.

On or about	this may have happened
9/30/63 Monday	MCS recieves a transcript in which Silvia Duran discusses an American and his problem with a Soviet Counsul. Win Scott writes "Can we identify?" on transcript. Goodpasture notifies Flick that an American is apparently trying to get a visa and that the COS would like to ID. The Cuban and Soviet monitors are asked to notify Flick of any conversation involving an american, or in English. ETC, HOWEVER.
10/1/63	Flick is notified by a monitor that there is an English conversation on the Soviet tap. Flick listens and hears the man ID himself as Oswald. He pulls the tape and marks it "urgent" and notifies Goodpasture that they have an ID on an American. The tape is delivered to Tarasoff for immediate transcription. It is recieved late this day or early on the second by Goodpasture. Disposition of tape unknown, could "urgent" tapes have been routinely retained for longer period? Goodpasture now has ID but does not know for sure that it is the one that Scott has asked about. The guy in the 9/27 conversation sounds real interesting but there is nothing in this conversation, OR 9/28 that clearly connects. She discusses reporting it with Manell. There is some disagreement over whose responsiblity it is to report. Either decision is made, or conflict continues until photos is checked.
Goodpasture ties in 9/28 Soviet conversation re: address.	
10/7/63	Photos from 10/1, 10/2, 10/3, 10/4 (?) are recieved in base from Soviet Embassy.
10/8/63	B. Manell drafts report cable. Goodpasture adds paragraph 2.
10/10/63	(in interim: Goodpasture tries to ID MMM photo? <u>how?</u>) HQ response recieved. Descriptions don't match. Controversy in station on whether Oswald's same. 9/27 + 9/28 conversation tied DEFINATELY in to LHO during this week. by similarity of subtantive content of cable and conversation and voice comparison.
10/16/63	Oswald "P" file opened.
10/18/63	by this time photo of MMM recieved at Station. Goodpasture picks up on it. This MMM photo one from Cubemb on 10/15.

10/21/63

10/15 MMM shown to penetration agents by this time. What response? MCS cables HQ asking for a photo of LHO. For what purpose? Was it just to compare to surveillance photos? Were they planning on showing to penatration agents? why? note: quite a few people say interest level was high--so what actions were taken?

HSCA Interview of David Atlee Phillips at HSCA offices, 8/23/78, 1:20 to 4:35 P.M., by Dan Hardway, Charles Berk, and Gaeton Fonzi.

Mr. Phillips was reminded that the CIA omnibus release letter still applied to our discussions and that he should feel free to answer our questions in spite of any secrecy oath that he may have executed during his employment with the CIA. He was asked if he remembered and understood the letter and if he wanted to review the letter again. Mr. Phillips stated that he remembered the letter and did not think it necessary to see the letter again.

Mr. Phillips was asked about his activities in Mexico that related to his job as Chief of Covert Action in the Mexico City Station from 1961 to 1963. Mr. Phillips was asked how many persons were in his propoganda shop in Mexico City. He said that it was manned only by himself, a case officer under his direction and a secretary. He later added that there was also one other case officer under his direction who worked under deep cover outside of the Embassy. Mr. Phillips stated that from 1961 to 1963 he ran only about 6 or 7 operations or projects. He added that there would have also been many "ad hoc" actions. Under questioning, he stated that it is possible that he was responsible for as many as 14 to 17 ongoing operations and 3 to 6 developmental stage operations. Most of these operations were directed at the Cuban target and "the great percentage of them had an anti-Cuban or anti-Soviet bias."

Mr. Phillips was asked about the handling of agents. He stated that he himself handled "very very few" agents. "Usually I met with someone who was working deep cover and they in turn would handle several agents." Mr. Phillips did recall handling one agent personally, a radio-TV broadcaster. He also said that he would often meet with other agents even

though he was not handling them on a day to day basis. He stated that at all times he had at least one deep cover officer working outside of the Embassy and that, sometimes, he had two such officers.

Mr. Phillips stated that he did have access, and did use in some of his propoganda activities, agents who were located outside of Mexico. Mr. Phillips also stated that he did use a few assets that he had developed prior to his transfer to Mexico City; he specifically recalled a man named SAYAS who had been a newspaperman in Cuba and went to work in Mexico City. He said that while he had been a propoganda officer for the JMARC operation he had used assets that he had developed during his prior tour of duty in Havana. Mr. Phillips said that such assets were usually handled by him personally during the Bay of Pigs.

Mr. Phillips stated that during the Bay of Pigs operation he travelled to Miami "fairly frequently; every 6 weeks, 3 weeks, 5 weeks." He stated that responsibility for propoganda operations were divided between him and his subordinate in Miami, William Kent. When asked to explain that division Mr. Phillips stated:

> Kent reported to my shop in Washington. He had day to day contact with the groups we were supporting down there, the student group and the doctors or whatever, and the people involved in Radio Swan.

Phillips stated that Radio Swan was run out of Miami, through the mechanism of the Gibralter Steamship Company. He did say that he was in contact with the agent who ran Radio Swan. He said that he felt uncomfortable naming than agent and suggested we ask the Agency for his identity.

Mr. Phillips stated that when he traveled to Miami he often went to see the people he knew from Havana, including those he was running as agents himself. He would also, on occassion, meet with agents whom

Bill Kent was running "if Bill Kent got to the point where he felt he would like a little weight." Sometimes he went down to Miami on a "trouble shooting" mission, as when problems developed with a commercial radio station the Agency was funding.

Mr. Phillips stated that he had had no recent contact with Mr. Kent relating to anything being done by this Committee. He did state that, approximately a month ago when Mr. Kent retired from the CIA, he received a call from Mr. Kent. He said that Mr. Kent said that he was setting up an executive employment agency and had asked for Mr. Phillips help in finding jobs for former employees of the agency as well as referring people for specific skilled jobs. They did not discuss the HSCA at all, according to Phillips.

Mr. Phillips stated that it would be accurate to state that there were two "sets" of propoganda activities during the Bay of Pigs; one that was run out of the Miami offices coordinated by Bill Kent and a second set that he personally ran without coordinating with Mr. Kent. Most of Mr. Phillips prior established assets were in the second set of propoganda operations.

Mr. Phillips said that even after he became Chief of Cuban Operations in Mexico City he still worked very closely with the propoganda shop, and his successor as head of that shop, James Flannery, in propoganda operations.

Mr. Phillips said that his "Cuban shop" covered the activities of the Cuban Embassy and that a special group covered the airport. He said that a good deal of time was

spent looking for opportunities to recruit Cubans who came to Mexico City. The shop also ran a debriefing center for Cubans who left Cuba by way of Mexico. He also said that one of the primary activities of the Cuban shop would have been to identify the DGI officers in the Cuban Embassy and their functions, duties and assignments whenever possible. Mr. Phillips said that he was still involved in propaganda activities at this time specifically recalling a Mexican broadcaster whose radio station could be heard in Cuba. Mr. Phillips pointed out that he had been a close friend of Mr. Flannery's and that Mr. Flannery was made Chief of Covert Action in Mexico on his, Phillip's, recommendation.

Mr. Phillips' said that he had "quite good" relations with Win Scott and that he reported directly to him as opposed to reporting through the Deputy Chief of Station which would have been the routine manner. Mr. Phillips stated that he thought that Robert Shaw had been in charge of the Cuban photographic surveillance operations and that they had two penetration agents in the Cuban Embassy. He stated that he could not remember the names of the penetration agents and was not sure of the cryptonyms.

Mr. Phillips was asked why his name came up so infrequently in a review of Agency documents of this period from Mexico City. He said that his name should appear on any "formal project" he had going, but that he "did like to delegate work." He said that his name must be on many papers.

Mr. Phillips said that there was a CI responsibility in the Cuban shop. "You always watch out for it, but there was no formal program." He said, however, that "I never really understood what CI was." Phillips said that there were some CIA officers who made counter-intelligence their primary concern during their entire careers but that he was not one of them. He described the CI effectiveness of the Mexico City Station as "average" and its Cuban section as "less than average."

Mr. Phillips stated that he was aware of the existence of the Special Affairs Staff in Washington that dealt with Cuban matters. He was also aware that the SAS had its own counter-intelligence section. He recalled meeting the Chief of that section, Hal SWENSON, on a trip to Washington. He also said that it would have been routine for Mr. Swenson to have traveled to Mexico City on "routine trips" or special cases. He said that he had probably seen Swenson in Mexico but that he did not recall any specific meetings.

Mr. Phillips recalled that the Legat office of the U.S. Embassy in Mexico was large; that it had 11 to 20 officers assigned to it. He said that there was a close relationship between the Agency station and the Legat office. He said that the Legat got "drop copies" of most reports. He said that it would have been routine to advise the Legat of "interesting cases" and that an American reporting to a foreign embassy would have been such a case. He said that a local dissemination would have definately been routine and that this liaison

relationship would have been at least partially responsible for reporting such a visit to Headquarters.

Mr. Phillips was queried about whether, in such a case, it would have been routine for the Agency station to take any action other than just reporting the information that had come to its attention. Mr. Phillips said that it could have happened in certain circumstances, such as if the contact looked as if he had recruitment potential or was a serious security case. In those instances it was possible that other actions would be taken. Mr. Phillips remembers one such instance specifically and pointed out that it is related in his book, Nightwatch, on pp. 126-128. This is a story of an American military officer who offered to spy for the Cubans and an operation mounted against him by the Agency in Mexico. In response to a direct question Mr. Phillips acknowledged that the Station could, and often did, take actions other than just reporting in regard to Americans in Mexico that were in contact with Soviet or Bloc Embassies without a specific request from another interested agency; i.e., they often took investigative and operational action on their own initiative. Mr. Phillips said that the reason that the Station could do this was Mr. Scott's ranking (informal) in the agency. Mr. Phillips illustrated this point by saying that when Mr. Scott returned to Washington to report he did not go to the Chief of Western Hemisphere Division but directly to either the DCI or DDP. He pointed out that Scott had been a division chief himself prior to his assignment as Chief of Station in Mexico.

Mr. Phillips was asked if the CIA shared assets and informants with the FBI in Mexico. He said that he did not know of any such cases but there was coordination and liaison with the Bureau on the surveillance operations.

Mr. Phillips acknowledged that one additional area in which the Station and the FBI shared an interest was the colony of American expatriates in Mexico. He said that he was not sure of who had the responsibility for that area in the Station but that it may ~~of~~ have been Ms. Ann Goodpasture. Mr. Phillips stated that he was not aware of any Agency liaison in Mexico City with either Army or Navy regarding counter-intelligence or counter-espionage cases. He said that he had never heard of any arguments that may have occured concerning whose responsibility it was to report Oswald's initial contact with the Soviet Embassy or about the extensiveness of the Station's reporting after the assassination.

Mr. Phillips does remember Viola June COBB. "Blonde, flew an airplane, track record for hitting a lot of beds in Cuba, had a twin sister involved in aviation. That's what comes to mind." He vaguely remembers messages or reports from or about her coming out of his Cuban shop but he believes that she was run out of Washington or Miami as an asset and that someone from one of those two places would have regularly come to Mexico to run her.

Mr. Phillips stated that he did not recall an officer with a hair lip or who spoke with a lisp.

Phillips stated that he did not know if Ms. Cobb was also an informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Phillips stated that he recalls three or four members of the Warren Commission staff coming to Mexico. He said that he may have chatted with them informally but he had no formal dealings with them. He said that they spent most of their time with Mr. Scott.

Mr. Phillips said that he first heard the name of Silvia Duran about the time he arrived in Mexico, as soon as he started reading the telephone tap transcripts. "Her name appeared time and time again." He added: "We had no interest in her. She wasn't friendly with anyone." Mr. Phillips had previously mentioned, in his discussion of the Cuban shop's interest in recruiting agents, the name of Ambassador Lachuga and their interest in pitching him. Mr. Phillips was shown Slawson's memo concerning his trip to Mexico where Scott told him that the CIA had a substantial prior interest in Duran because of her affair with Lachuga. Phillips seemed surprised and said "No one let me in on this operation." Mr. Phillips said that it is possible that the Agency pitched Duran. "At one time we pitched almost everyone at the Cuban Embassy. She must have been considered." Mr. Phillips said that it was possible that she was not pitched because the station could not identify any of her weaknesses. At this point Mr. Phillips was told about the LITAMEL/9 reports on Duran that said that all that

~~all that~~ would have to be done to recruit her was get a blonde, blue eyed American in bed with the little "puta." Mr. Phillips admitted that it sounded like she had at least been targeted and that the station's interest was substantial and that the weakness and means had been identified. He pointed out, however, that targeting does not necessarily mean that she had been pitched, or, even if she was pitched, that she had accepted the pitch. Mr. Phillips said that he was not aware that a pitch had been made.

Phillips stated that Ms. Duran's 201 file should be "very thick". He stated that a thin 201 file prior to the assassination "would be very surprising". He said that a name trace should come up with at least a lot of 3x5 cards that predate the assassination.

Mr. Phillips stated that he saw Lechuga only three times after he left Cuba: once on an airplane from Miami--"we just nodded"--; once at the inauguration of Mexican President Diaz Ordaz; and once when he was having lunch at a fancy restaurant near the American Embassy in Mexico. On the last encounter Phillips said that he knew Lechuga was going to be there and that he had specifically gone there to talk to him. He said that Lachuga turned off all the advances he made.

Phillips was asked why the Agency had sent a cable to Mexico after Ms. Duran's arrest saying "don't allow any Americans to have contact with her." (paraphrase). He said: "Don't know. I can't tell you why they did that. I can't guess why." He said that he was not aware that the

Warren Commission staffers who were in Mexico wanted to talk to Duran. He said that he knew Clarence BOONSTRA well, that the last he heard he was in North Florida, but that he had never discussed the assassination or Oswald with him.

Mr. Phillips said that he vaguely remembered that Win Scott did have a safe in his office. He guessed that Scott and his secretary would have been the only people who had access to that saff. He said that Scott had had several secretaries over a period and that he only remembers the first name of one of them: Dottie. He said that he had no idea of what Scott kept in his safe. He said that when he, personally, was chief of station in the Dominican Republic, Brazil and Venezuela, he kept ~~really~~ "very sensitive" material in his safe in his office. He assumes that the same would have been true of Mr. Scott. Phillips offered the example that someone would call and say that someone at the Embassy was a prostitute, he would note that for the record ~~in~~ and keep it in the private safe. He guessed that the material in the safe would have been material Scott generated himself. He said that memos of meetings with the Mexican president in which sensitive topics were discussed would have been a likely candidate for retention in Scott's safe. He said that he does not know what happened to Scott's safe after he died but that he has heard a vague story that someone went out and found a lot of documents that Scott had kept.

Mr. Phillips stated that he thought that the Chief of

the DGI in Mexico was a man named "LUNA."

Mr. Phillips was asked about the story in his book concerning the DGI officer with the penchant for antique jewelry that appears at page 133. He said that he does not remember the name of that person, but says he took some literary license because he doesn't specifically recall if the person was, in fact, a DGI officer. "Thank God my next book is fiction," he said.

Phillips was asked about the following DGI officers:

Orestes Guillermo Ruiz Perez--"vaguely familiar";

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez--"Yes, familiar.";

Manual Vega--could have been Chief of DGI;

Luisa Calderñ--"familiar";

Teresa Proenza--"definitely familiar";

Alfredo Mirabal--"familiar";

Eusebio Azcue--the consul, "to my knowledge he was not Cuban intelligence."

Mr. Phillips was asked if Proenza was a CIA asset. He said "The name is familiar but I don't recall the context." He also could not remember if Luisa Calderon had been an asset. He said: "I don't really remember the true names of the agents. I never saw them or dealt with them." He stated that he could not remember whether the Agency had ever pitched Ruiz but that "there were several attempts to pitch intelligence types."

Mr. Phillips was shown Carlos Blanco's report of 28 June 1963. He stated that he had probably seen it previously but does not remember it specifically. He said that the name

Carlos Blanco had probably been made up for the purposes of this one report. He said that he recalled the name of Luisa Calderon a bit better after reading the document. He said that she may have been the asset who worked in the Embassy for the Agency but he still could not be certain because he could not recall the true names. He said that he did not know if there would have been a "further report" and that, if there was, it would not have necessarily been sent to Headquarters unless it had been of special interest.

Mr. Phillips was then shown the dispatch concerning Luisa's sister. (CIA # 3715.) He said that he does not know whether she was ever identified, contacted or used. He said that he had never heard of a "domestic exploitation section" and pointed out that the words were not capitalized.

Mr. Phillips stated that he did know Mr. Barney Hidalgo. He does not recall him ever being in Mexico but said that it was possible that Mr. Hidalgo could have been there and that he would not have known about it. He said that he had on occassion worked with Mr. Hidalgo. He said that Hidalgo did not have any executive talents, but he was involved in a lot of operations. He said that Hidalgo had some problems: "I don't want to say he was crazy, but I was always uncomfortable around him." Mr. Phillips also recognized the cryptonym AMMUG/1.

Mr. Phillips was shown CIA #'s 3665 and 3662 which are reports from AMMUG that the Cubans believed that Calderon had been recruited by the CIA and had, therefore, called her back

to Cuba. Mr. Phillips said that that did not help him recall that much about Calderon other than to make him think that she was not a CIA agent "because she went back to Cuba."

Mr. Phillips stated that he was not aware that after the assassination that Thomas Mann expressed a great deal of interest in the Mexico City investigation. He also said that he did not know why Mann would have been pressing for the arrest and questioning of Luisa Calderon. He said that, in fact, he had never known or heard that such was the case.

Mr. Phillips was shown the transcript of the Calderon call. (CIA 3717.) He said "I've seen this document before... when we were reviewing things after the assassination." He was asked what the Mexico Station had done to follow up on that conversation. He said that he could not recall that anything was done other than forwarding the conversation to Headquarters. He said that he did not know what Headquarters had done with it. He said that he could not remember being tasked or his shop being tasked, with anything concerning this lead. He said that he did not know if this conversation was given to the WC by HQ but acknowledged that it was not shown to the staff members who visited Mexico. He does not recall any specific follow up regarding Calderon. He does not know why Calderon was not arrested.

The section of Carlos Blanco's report concerning Teresa Proenza was pointed out to Phillips. He said that he thought the report may have been written by a person used by the station that thought that everyone was a communist. He said this may

have been LIHUFF/1. He said that the document did not help his memory that much and that "I don't know of any reason why she would be termed dangerous."

Phillips was shown the LITAMEL/9 contact report regarding the firing of Teresa Proenza (CIA # 3714.). Mr. Phillips stated that he dos not know why Teresa Proenza was fired. He said that he did recognize the cryptonym AMROD. He said that it was a disinformation operation and that it may have been aimed, in part, at Teresa Proenza. He said that the person in his book that he refers to as a cultural attache with a penchant for antique jewelry was not Teresa Proenza. He said that he remembers that the person he refers to in that story was definately a man. Phillips stuck adamantly to this contention.

Phillips stated that he does not recall that the Mexico City Station ever developed any information that Oswald was in contact with anyone else at the Cuban Embassy other than Azcue and Duran. Mr. Phillips was shown the FBI report of an interview with Ms. Proenza's brother. Mr. Phillips stated that it did not ring any bells and he could not recall ever having heard of such a thing. Mr. Phillips was also informed of the FBI report from a CIA source that indicated that Oswald had had contact with Proenza. He said that he had never heard of it. Mr. Phillips then stated that some things were coming back to him. He asked if Proenza was a lesbian but he didn't recall if that was a fact or part of the disinformation campaign aimed at her.

The timing of the departures of Calderon and Proenza was pointed out to Mr. Phillips as well as the indications that they had met Oswald, had prior knowledge of the assassination, the nominal reason regarding Proenza over the Raul Roa note. He was asked if he knew if their recalls were connected and if they were connected with the assassination. He said that he did not know, maybe Calderon and Proenza had been lovers, but that may have been part of the disinformation, he just could not remember which, fact or fiction.

Mr. Phillips stated that it was very possible that HQ or JMWAVE could have recruited and run Cuban agents in Mexico without the knowledge of the Mexico Station. Phillips said: "I suppose it would have been possible for an agent in Mexico City to be run out of JMWAVE station in Miami without my knowledge, but I would have been furious if I found out about it:. He said that this may have even been "probable" in the case of a "sensitive operation," but he pointed out that anyone doing that took the risk of crossing Win Scott who was close to both the DCI and DDP. This lead Mr. Phillips to say that if that was the case then the DDP, at least, would probably have approved the WAVE use of an agent in Mexico. We took Mr. Phillips through the documents on Ms. Calderon again and asked him if this could have been an instance such as that we were talking about. He said that it very well could have been but that he had no knowledge that would indicate that that was the case. He said that this was the kind of thing "they might have asked Barney Hidalgo to do." Phillips agreed that

CIA #3665 indicates that a pitch to Calderon was to be made by someone outside of Mexico. "If it was someone from the CIA there would be something in her 201 files... but possibly it could have been run out of a soft file." He said that her file should be substantial. He said he could not explain why the Calderon conversation would not have been in her 201 while it was in Oswald's.

Mr. Phillips was informed of the testing of the impulse camera beginning on September 27, 1963. He stated that he had "no recollection" of the disposition of the photographs obtained during that testing.

Mr. Phillips stated that if another cable (a third) was sent to HQ regarding Oswald prior to the assassination that he did not know about it.

Mr. Phillips was asked if there was a way for HQ and a Station to communicate without the commo becoming part of the permanent record. He stated that there was at least one way that he knew of in addition to telephone and personal courier. He said that it was technically possible to set up a "telcom" system by persuading the cable operators to set it up on a "back channel". He stated that such a system would work on a question and answer sheme. He said "It has been done on occassion but I don't recall it ever having been done in Mexico." Mr. Phillips also stated that he did not believe that there had been any telephone communications concerning the assassination. Refuting documents were not shown.

Mr. Phillips acknowledged that the FBI would manipulate their files on employees of the CIA at the Agency's behest. He also said that he would not be surprised if other catagories of files could be manipulated, including internal CIA files. Mr. Phillips was asked what factors would make him suspicious of a file. He said that missing references, pages that had half of them torn off, things like that would arouse his suspicion. He also listed a missing report from a sequentially numbered series of reports as one thing that would arouse his suspicion. In response to a direct question, Mr. Phillips said that, if what we had told him about Ms. Duran's file was true, then we could be fairly certain that her file had been "manipulated."

Mr. Phillips was asked about James Angleton. He said: "He didn't tell me anything about his operations. He kept promising to tell me, but he never did." He said that Angleton held his operation very tightly to his vest. Phillips said it is possible that J.C. King mignt have had some operations outside of the JMARC structure but that they could not have been funded without someone knowing about them. A division chief does have access to operational and developmental funds but, Phillips said, he has never heard of a discretionary fund available to Division Chiefs. He said that the developmental fund usually had a lot of money in it but that it eventually had to be accounted for. "I can't remember having such a fund that I didn't account for through the DDP."

Mr. Phillips said that he did not participate, nor was he aware of, in any campaign after the assassination to spread misinformation about the death of Kennedy. He could not explain why the misinformation that came from the Cuban groups and individuals that tended to point to Castro involvement were predominantly from assets that he had handled personally as opposed to ones that had been ran out of the Miami station. He said that he agreed that it was strange that the one peice of evidence that tended to show at least DGI foreknowledge was not pursued by his shop while disinformation from his former assets occupied the attentions of investigators in that area. Mr. Phillips stated that he did not kow of any hard evidence that existed in 1963 that pointed to Castro's involvement.

Mr. Phillips was asked about his operations in Havana, specifically the names of the operations he was involved in, when he worked there as a covert operative from 1958 to 1961. He said he went to Cuba in the summer of 1958 after he had retired from the Agency. He said the Agency heard he was setting up his own public relations business there and asked him to continue working for them, not on a staff status but on a contract basis. Most of his work, he said, involved propaganda operations for Latin American coundtries and not Cuba. He did do what he termed "ad hoc" stuff as it came along and he did develop propaganda news stories and editorial material that was sent out to the provincial newspapers. He also specifically recalled attending a meeting of a group of businessmen who

began talking about developing anti-Castro activity, but that group never got off the ground because there was an informant in the group and most of the participants were shortly afterwards arrested.

When asked about his relationsip with Julio Lobo, he became a bit upset and said he thought he had covered that adequately in his deposition. He says as far as he can recall he met Lobo only one time, perhaps it was even in Madrid and not Havana, he doesn't recall, and he had no substantial dealings with him. He wanted to know if Veciana's story about Bishop is still being considered and if any decision about his being Bishop had be conclusively arrived at. He said he doesn't like living under the fear and tension of possibly being called before the television cameras and having Veciana suddenly stand up and point his finger at him and say that he is Bishop and that he saw him with Oswald. Phillips was told by the interviewers that they had no authority to disclose anything of substance about our investigation to him. He asked that the interviewers seek permission to let him know what was going on. He was told that his request would be brought to high-level attention but that a response of any kind at all could not be assured.

Phillips stated that he did not know Paul Bethel very well. but it was not Bethel who introduced him to Lopez-Fresquet. He said that that introduction was made by Bethel's boss, Dick Cushing.

Phillips said that he had no additional recollections on Jack Cogswell other than he remembered that he was an

American businessman in Havana.

Mr. Phillips stated that he "probably" did have some contacts with someone or some persons associated with the Moa Bay Mining Company, but he did not recall any specific names. He also "must have" had some contact with Freeport Sulpher people. "I was fairly socially active at the time and the name of the company is familiar to me."

Mr. Phillips said that he did not have many public relations clients during that time. He could recall only the man who owned Ambar Motors and the El Mundo newspaper. He also traded for free French lessons at the Berlitz School although he can not recall exactly what kind of public relations work he did in return.

Phillips did not recall the name Darnell.

He said that he did know Wayne Smith, political attache at the American Embassy, very well. He remembered him as a big guy because they were in a little theatre group together and in one play Phillips had to throw Smith out of a window.

Phillips said that he did not know Roberto Vale.

Phillips was asked about the procedure of traveling out of the country on covert operations. He said he always traveled out under his true name and with his legitimate passport. He would have other documentation on him for use with his alias when he arrived in the country. He said that's the way it was always done by every agent as far as he knew unless it was a "very sensitive operation." He knew of no specific sensitive operation in which a phoney passport was issued by the agency.

"I don't know how that mechanism worked," he said. He added that he had never had a phoney passport.

Mr. Phillips said that he had met McClendon (Gordon) once whent they were in college. He said that he had not seen him again until September of 1976 when he attended a Retired Intelligence Officers meeting. Later McClendon had called him and reminded him of an incident mentioned in Nightwatch involving a shool day's episode and MecClendon told him that he was the kid who picked him up in his car. As far as Phillips can recall, he never had any contact with McClendon during the intervening years. He never met McClendon at any time during 1963 in Dallas.

Phillips stated that he has no familiarity with the Catherwood Foundation or Cummins Caterwood or E. Wharton Shober. He was not specifically familiar with the Foundation's Cuban Aid Relief operation in Miami.

Phillips said that the debriefing centers in Miami were under the aegis of the CIA but the Agency only got the product from them, they were actually run by another agency. He said that they may have been ran by military intelligence. He said that he had never met any of the supervisory personnel who ran those centers.